Scientists have long studied the actions that impact basic survival in various domains of life, such as defense, foraging, reproduction, thermoregulation, and so on, as to reveal the nature of emotion. Each domain is characterized by a repertoire of distinct actions, and each action is presumed to be caused by a dedicated neural circuit, called a survival circuit. Survival circuits are said to be triggered by sensory events in the world, producing a range of actions from obligatory, stereotypic reflexes to more flexible, deliberate responses. In this paper, we consider recent evidence from behavioral ecology that even so-called 'reflexes' are better understood as purposeful, flexible actions that unfold across a range of temporal trajectories. They are highly context-dependent and tailored to the requirements of the situation. We then consider the neuroscience of motor control which suggests that motor actions are assembled by neural populations, not triggered by simple circuits. Finally, we consider the value of these suggestions for understanding both species-general and species-specific contributions to emotion.
What knowledge informs us about the nature of human emotion? The motivational states and functional organization of behaviors closely linked to survival across species would seem to be natural entry point to this complex question. Accordingly, some scientists propose that emotions evolved long ago to ensure survival during defense, foraging, reproduction, thermoregulation, and fluid intake, such that humans and many non-human animals should share the neural circuits for emotion (or at least some types of emotion [1] . In this view, emotions are assumed to be species-general -fundamentally conserved states that cause species-specific actions. For example, rats are assumed to be fearful when they protect themselves from a predator and flies are assumed to be angry when they attack each other. An emotion state is thought to trigger one of several distinct actions, and each action is thought to be executed by a dedicated neuronal apparatus. Discovering the brain basis of emotions, in this view, de facto means carefully mapping the circuitry that controls survival-related behaviors. Consider the domain of defense (i.e. fear), for example, when an animal must protect itself or its offspring from a potential threat. Various taxonomies of defensive behaviors (i.e. fear) have been proposed, organized by type of threat [2] , proximity of the threat [3], or proposed computations [4] . These taxonomies differ in various ways, but share a common assumption: that a mammalian brain contains some number of innate, dedicated circuits -fear circuits -each of which triggers a fixed reaction pattern such as freezing, flight or defensive aggression when activated by the sensory features of a threat, such as a predator. From this perspective, fear is a specific adaptation associated with a specific state caused by specific neural circuitry.
An alternative account proposes that the circuitry for emotional instances is assembled by a brain, as needed, via the interplay of evolved mechanisms, some of which are species-general and others which are speciesspecific. The circuitry that controls survival-related actions -survival circuits -is not assumed to be the circuitry for emotion, and therefore is only one ingredient in making human emotions. As a consequence, understanding the brain basis of emotion requires more than just the careful mapping the circuitry that supports survival-related action: it also requires an understanding the neurobiology of how these actions and their sensory consequences are made meaningful as emotions in a brain (e.g. [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Taxonomies make an appearance in some versions of this approach, as well: one influential taxonomy, for example, assumes that defensive behaviors can be organized along a continuum of flexibility and control, anchored at one end by defensive reflexes, which are said to be executed in an obligatory, rapid manner, with little variation from instance to instance, and at the other end by flexible, goal-direct actions that result from forecasting future outcomes, with fixed 
